C Citigroup Inc.

[alexis]

Comparto,me gusta mas BAC

Segun los analistas tiene un upside de casi 50% contra menos de un 20% de C
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/st ... testimates
Por ahora mantengo mis BAC, pero nunca se sabe cuando te pueden abrochar...

[pedrovet]

Y entonces que se hace? se compra o se vende??

creo que hay que tener un SL razonable, y me parece muy factible que haga algo mas de 5 dolares antes de marzo. es un 10%, no me parece mucho pero no es despreciable. no esspero un batacazo con esta mientras la FED tenga acciones.
Le veo mas color a BAC

Dick Bove Sees No Put-Back Apocalypse for Citi: Losses Could Be as Little as $5 Billion
Published: Monday, 8 Nov 2010 | 3:30 PM ET

Well-known banking sector analyst Dick Bove thinks that Citi is at risk for $40 billion in put-back claims. Only $8 billion of those claims will ulimately be successful, in Bove's view. And, after recovering on the mortgages which it will have to repurchase, the total loss could be as low as $5 billion.

Bove begins his analysis of Citigroup's potential repurchase exposure with Citigroup's $504 billion portfolio of serviced but not held (SBNH) loans.

Bove nets out 22 percent of Citi's SBNH loan portfolio, to account for Citi's third party indemnifications. (Third party indemnifiers have agreed, according to Citigroup, to cover losses on the indemnified portion of the SBNH portfolio.) Once the indemnified portion of the portfolio is removed, we are left with the remaining 78 percent, or $393 billion. This number represents the total unhedged exposure of Citi's SBNH loan portfolio.

Bove next makes an estimate of what he thinks the potential default rate is likely to be on Citi's SBNH portfolio in the future.

Citigroup is reporting a current default rate on their SBNH portfolio of 8.1 percent. "That's consistent with FDIC data," Bove says, in reference to the nationally reported default rate of 7.47 percent.

In order to create what he believes to be a conservative estimate for the model, Bove uses a projected default rate of 20 percent for the SNBH portfolio. "That's two and a half times what the actual default rate on the portfolio is right now," he says. Bove believes that this increase in the model should account for the possibility of a substantial uptick in default rates.

Based on the 20 percent default rate, Citi would be looking at a pool of loans worth about $79 billion for potential claims to be submitted against.

Of course, the mortgage must actually be defective to be considered for repurchase. "If the mortgage is in default, but the paperwork is pristine, they can't be put back," says Bove.

In the next step of his model, Bove reduces the total dollar amount of the potential exposure to account for only those mortgages that have associated representations and warranties. Bove's analysis assumes that only one if four mortgages in Citi's service book have representations and warranties associated with their sale to investors.

(In his sworn testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Richard Bowen indicates that all of the mortgages within one sizable channel of of Citi's loan acquisitions had representations and warranties associated with them. Unfortunately, Citi has not released the breakdown of the SBNH vintages by acquisition channel, so a more definitive analysis isn't possible at this time; therefore, Mr. Bove's 25 percent estimate for Citgroup's percentages of loans with representation and warranties may be more accurate overall. We really cannot tell without more information. Note: I have requested more detailed information about Citigroup's loan acquisition channels and the vintages related to the SBNH loan portfolio. That information has not yet been provided by Citigroup.)

Using Bove's 25 percent estimate to account for only those mortgages with associated representations and warranties would reduce Citigroup's total dollar amount at risk for put-backs down to about $20 billion.

After all the calculations to arrive at the dollar value at risk for attempted put-backs, Bove ultimately assumes that only 40 percent of the remaining $20 billion in exposure can be put-back successfully to

Citigroup, based on the terms of the representations and warranties of the loans involved.

That would bring us to a total of $8 billion: This number is the final estimate of money Citi might ultimately be required to pay out to investors.

Bove then accounts for a recovery value on the loans. The current average recovery on mortgage loans is 35 percent — using that figure would mean a 65 percent haircut for Citigroup.

Based on that calculation, Bove estimates Citi's total losses from their servicing book to be about $5 billion.

(Of course, the recovery process takes time, while the potential cash impact to Citi of paying investors would be immediate at the time of payment.)

However, there is an additional time factor to consider when evaluating any potential cash outlay from Citi. "It takes time to review all those loans," says Bove. "Once you've done that, all you've done is select out the mortgages you want to put-back. You haven't yet approached Citigroup. When you approach Citigroup, you now have to deal with the fact that they may object to every one of those loans" being put back to them.

After the loans have been submitted back to Citi, the legal process begins. Bove points out that courts have held that loans must be reviewed individually. And how long is that process going to take?

It's difficult to say, because the scenario of a legal review of that volume of loans has yet to unfold. This much seems likely: If the loans must be reviewed individually, there are going to be fairly significant time delays before the bank is forced to buyback the loans. To quote Bove: "It's going to be multiyear process." That means the costs of the putbacks to Citigroup would be booked against multiple calendar years.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/40075296

[/quote]

[nadasepierde]

Dick Bove Sees No Put-Back Apocalypse for Citi: Losses Could Be as Little as $5 Billion
Published: Monday, 8 Nov 2010 | 3:30 PM ET

Well-known banking sector analyst Dick Bove thinks that Citi is at risk for $40 billion in put-back claims. Only $8 billion of those claims will ulimately be successful, in Bove's view. And, after recovering on the mortgages which it will have to repurchase, the total loss could be as low as $5 billion.

Bove begins his analysis of Citigroup's potential repurchase exposure with Citigroup's $504 billion portfolio of serviced but not held (SBNH) loans.

Bove nets out 22 percent of Citi's SBNH loan portfolio, to account for Citi's third party indemnifications. (Third party indemnifiers have agreed, according to Citigroup, to cover losses on the indemnified portion of the SBNH portfolio.) Once the indemnified portion of the portfolio is removed, we are left with the remaining 78 percent, or $393 billion. This number represents the total unhedged exposure of Citi's SBNH loan portfolio.

Bove next makes an estimate of what he thinks the potential default rate is likely to be on Citi's SBNH portfolio in the future.

Citigroup is reporting a current default rate on their SBNH portfolio of 8.1 percent. "That's consistent with FDIC data," Bove says, in reference to the nationally reported default rate of 7.47 percent.

In order to create what he believes to be a conservative estimate for the model, Bove uses a projected default rate of 20 percent for the SNBH portfolio. "That's two and a half times what the actual default rate on the portfolio is right now," he says. Bove believes that this increase in the model should account for the possibility of a substantial uptick in default rates.

Based on the 20 percent default rate, Citi would be looking at a pool of loans worth about $79 billion for potential claims to be submitted against.

Of course, the mortgage must actually be defective to be considered for repurchase. "If the mortgage is in default, but the paperwork is pristine, they can't be put back," says Bove.

In the next step of his model, Bove reduces the total dollar amount of the potential exposure to account for only those mortgages that have associated representations and warranties. Bove's analysis assumes that only one if four mortgages in Citi's service book have representations and warranties associated with their sale to investors.

(In his sworn testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Richard Bowen indicates that all of the mortgages within one sizable channel of of Citi's loan acquisitions had representations and warranties associated with them. Unfortunately, Citi has not released the breakdown of the SBNH vintages by acquisition channel, so a more definitive analysis isn't possible at this time; therefore, Mr. Bove's 25 percent estimate for Citgroup's percentages of loans with representation and warranties may be more accurate overall. We really cannot tell without more information. Note: I have requested more detailed information about Citigroup's loan acquisition channels and the vintages related to the SBNH loan portfolio. That information has not yet been provided by Citigroup.)

Using Bove's 25 percent estimate to account for only those mortgages with associated representations and warranties would reduce Citigroup's total dollar amount at risk for put-backs down to about $20 billion.

After all the calculations to arrive at the dollar value at risk for attempted put-backs, Bove ultimately assumes that only 40 percent of the remaining $20 billion in exposure can be put-back successfully to

Citigroup, based on the terms of the representations and warranties of the loans involved.

That would bring us to a total of $8 billion: This number is the final estimate of money Citi might ultimately be required to pay out to investors.

Bove then accounts for a recovery value on the loans. The current average recovery on mortgage loans is 35 percent — using that figure would mean a 65 percent haircut for Citigroup.

Based on that calculation, Bove estimates Citi's total losses from their servicing book to be about $5 billion.

(Of course, the recovery process takes time, while the potential cash impact to Citi of paying investors would be immediate at the time of payment.)

However, there is an additional time factor to consider when evaluating any potential cash outlay from Citi. "It takes time to review all those loans," says Bove. "Once you've done that, all you've done is select out the mortgages you want to put-back. You haven't yet approached Citigroup. When you approach Citigroup, you now have to deal with the fact that they may object to every one of those loans" being put back to them.

After the loans have been submitted back to Citi, the legal process begins. Bove points out that courts have held that loans must be reviewed individually. And how long is that process going to take?

It's difficult to say, because the scenario of a legal review of that volume of loans has yet to unfold. This much seems likely: If the loans must be reviewed individually, there are going to be fairly significant time delays before the bank is forced to buyback the loans. To quote Bove: "It's going to be multiyear process." That means the costs of the putbacks to Citigroup would be booked against multiple calendar years.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/40075296

El MEH noviembre Mar 09, 2010 10:34 am

Dick Bove no ve Apocalipsis Pon-Back de Citi: las pérdidas podrían ser tan poco como $ 5 mil millones
Publicado: Lunes, 08 de noviembre 2010 | 3:30 PM ET

Traduccion:

Bien conocido analista del sector bancario Dick Bove cree que Citi está en riesgo por US $ 40 mil millones en las alegaciones de la espalda. Sólo $ 8 mil millones de esas reclamaciones ulimately será un éxito, teniendo en cuenta Bove. Y, después de recuperarse de las hipotecas que tendrán que volver a comprar, la pérdida total podría ser tan bajo como $ 5 mil millones.

Bove comienza su análisis de la exposición potencial de recompra de Citigroup con 504 mil millones dólares de Citigroup cartera de servicios pero no se celebró (SBNH) préstamos.

Bove redes a cabo el 22 por ciento de la cartera de crédito de Citi SBNH, para dar cuenta de indemnizaciones de terceros Citi. (Indemnifiers terceras partes han acordado, según Citigroup, para cubrir las pérdidas en la parte de indemnización de la cartera SBNH.) Una vez que la parte indemnizada de la cartera se retira, nos quedamos con el restante 78 por ciento, o 393 mil millones dólares. Este número representa la exposición total sin cobertura de la cartera de crédito de Citi SBNH.

Bove siguiente hace una estimación de lo que él piensa que la tasa de morosidad potencial es probable que sea sobre la cartera de Citi SBNH en el futuro.

Citigroup informa de una tasa de morosidad actual de su cartera de SBNH del 8,1 por ciento. "Eso es coherente con los datos de la FDIC", dijo Bove, en referencia a la tasa de morosidad a nivel nacional informó de 7.47 por ciento.

Con el fin de crear lo que él cree que es una estimación conservadora para el modelo, Bove utiliza una tasa de morosidad prevista del 20 por ciento de la cartera de SNBH. "Eso es dos veces y media lo que la tasa de morosidad real en la cartera es en este momento", dice. Bove cree que este aumento en el modelo deben tener en cuenta la posibilidad de un alza sustancial en las tasas de morosidad.

Con base en la tasa de 20 por ciento por defecto, Citi estaría buscando a un conjunto de préstamos por valor de unos 79 mil millones dólares para las posibles reclamaciones que se presentará en contra.

Por supuesto, la hipoteca en realidad debe ser defectuoso para ser considerado para recompra. "Si la hipoteca está en mora, pero el papeleo es virgen, no se puede poner de nuevo", afirma Bove.

En el siguiente paso de su modelo, Bove reduce la cantidad total en dólares de la exposición potencial para tener en cuenta sólo las hipotecas que se han asociado las representaciones y garantías. análisis Bove se supone que sólo uno, si cuatro hipotecas en el libro de servicio de Citi han representaciones y garantías relacionadas con su venta a los inversores.

(En su testimonio bajo juramento ante la Crisis Financiera Comisión de Investigación, Richard Bowen indica que todos los de las hipotecas dentro de un canal importante de las adquisiciones de préstamos de Citi había representaciones y garantías relacionadas con ellos. Desafortunadamente, Citi no ha publicado el desglose de las cosechas SBNH por canal de adquisición, por lo que un análisis más definitivo no es posible en este momento, por lo tanto, de 25 años el Sr. Bove estimación por ciento de Citigroup de porcentajes de los préstamos con la representación y la garantía puede ser más general precisa Realmente no se puede decir sin más información Nota:.. I han solicitado información más detallada acerca de los canales de Citigroup la adquisición de préstamos y las cosechas relacionadas con la cartera de préstamos SBNH. Esta información aún no ha sido proporcionada por parte de Citigroup.)

Utilizando 25 Bove estimación por ciento para tener en cuenta sólo las hipotecas con las representaciones asociadas y garantías que reducir la cantidad total en dólares de Citigroup en riesgo de poner-se echa atrás a cerca de $ 20 mil millones.

Después de todos los cálculos para llegar al valor del dólar en riesgo de intento de poner-backs, Bove en última instancia, se supone que sólo el 40 por ciento de los restantes $ 20 mil millones en la exposición se pueden poner, de nuevo con éxito

Citigroup, con base en los términos de las declaraciones y garantías de los créditos afectados.

Eso nos llevaría a un total de $ 8 mil millones: Este número es la estimación final del dinero de Citi en última instancia, podría ser obligado a pagar a los inversores.

Bove, a continuación, representa un valor de recuperación de los préstamos. La actual recuperación promedio de los préstamos hipotecarios es del 35 por ciento - con la cifra que significaría un recorte de 65 por ciento de Citigroup.

Con base en este cálculo, Bove estima que las pérdidas totales de Citi de su libro de mantenimiento ascenderá a unos 5 mil millones.

(Por supuesto, el proceso de recuperación lleva tiempo, mientras que el impacto potencial de dinero en efectivo a Citi de pagar a los inversores sería de inmediato en el momento del pago.)

Sin embargo, hay un factor de tiempo adicional para tener en cuenta al evaluar cualquier desembolso potencial de Citi. "Se necesita tiempo para revisar todos los préstamos", dijo Bove. "Una vez que hayas hecho esto, todo lo que he hecho es seleccionar las hipotecas que desea poner de nuevo-. Todavía no se acercó a Citigroup. Cuando se acerque a Citigroup, que ahora tienen que lidiar con el hecho de que puede oponerse a cada uno de esos préstamos "se puso de nuevo a ellos.

Después de los préstamos se han presentado de nuevo a Citi, el proceso legal comienza. Bove señala que los tribunales han sostenido que los préstamos deben ser revisados individualmente. ¿Y cuánto tiempo es que el proceso va a tomar?

Es difícil de decir, porque el escenario de una revisión jurídica de que el volumen de los préstamos aún tiene que desarrollarse. Esto parece mucho más probable: Si los préstamos debe ser revisado individualmente, no van a ser los retardos de tiempo bastante importante antes de que el banco se ve obligado a recompra de los préstamos. Para citar Bové: "Va a ser un proceso de varios años." Eso significa que los costos de la putbacks a Citigroup estaría reservado contra varios años naturales.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/40075296GYMEH

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[alexis]

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-0 ... -weil.html

Esta noticia la tiraron cuando BAC estaba en los minimos.
El tipo se contradice porque dice que esta barata pero que necesitaria de vuelta el TARP, que ya tuvo y al toque lo devolvio.
No se, lo veo contradictorio. Me parece que nadie le dio bola..

[alexis]

Alexis,para mi es para guardar mas si la tenes en usa...yo tengo cedear en 22,80y los guardo,abrazo

Lo voy a replantear, pero esta es media turra, viene para abajo hace rato y entre abajo de 12.
Hizo un rebote y tiene un target de los analistas en 18,50, o sea un upside de + del 40%.
No se...........

[alexis]

Que queres largar,no te entiendo

Queria vender en 12,70 que los paso, tengo la accion USA no Cedear.